Cilium provides security on multiple levels. Each can be used individually or combined together.
- Identity based Connectivity Access Control: Connectivity policies between endpoints (Layer 3),
e.g. any endpoint with label
role=frontendcan connect to any endpoint with label
- Restriction of accessible ports (Layer 4) for both incoming and outgoing
connections, e.g. endpoint with label
role=frontendcan only make outgoing connections on port 443 (https) and endpoint
role=backendcan only accept connections on port 443 (https).
- Fine grained access control on application protocol level to secure HTTP and
remote procedure call (RPC) protocols, e.g the endpoint with label
role=frontendcan only perform the REST API call
GET /userdata/[0-9]+, all other API interactions with
Currently on the roadmap, to be added soon:
- Authentication: Any endpoint which wants to initiate a connection to an
endpoint with the label
role=backendmust have a particular security certificate to authenticate itself before being able to initiate any connections. See GH issue 502 for additional details.
- Encryption: Communication between any endpoint with the label
role=frontendto any endpoint with the label
role=backendis automatically encrypted with a key that is automatically rotated. See GH issue 504 to track progress on this feature.
Identity based Connectivity Access Control¶
Container management systems such as Kubernetes deploy a networking model which assigns an individual IP address to each pod (group of containers). This ensures simplicity in architecture, avoids unnecessary network address translation (NAT) and provides each individual container with a full range of port numbers to use. The logical consequence of this model is that depending on the size of the cluster and total number of pods, the networking layer has to manage a large number of IP addresses.
Traditionally security enforcement architectures have been based on IP address
filters. Let’s walk through a simple example: If all pods with the label
role=frontend should be allowed to initiate connections to all pods with
role=backend then each cluster node which runs at least one pod
with the label
role=backend must have a corresponding filter installed
which allows all IP addresses of all
role=frontend pods to initiate a
connection to the IP addresses of all local
role=backend pods. All other
connection requests should be denied. This could look like this: If the
destination address is 10.1.1.2 then allow the connection only if the source
address is one of the following [10.1.2.2,10.1.2.3,22.214.171.124].
Every time a new pod with the label
either started or stopped, the rules on every cluster node which run any such
pods must be updated by either adding or removing the corresponding IP address
from the list of allowed IP addresses. In large distributed applications, this
could imply updating thousands of cluster nodes multiple times per second
depending on the churn rate of deployed pods. Worse, the starting of new
role=frontend pods must be delayed until all servers running
role=backend pods have been updated with the new security rules as
otherwise connection attempts from the new pod could be mistakenly dropped.
This makes it difficult to scale efficiently.
In order to avoid these complications which can limit scalability and
flexibility, Cilium entirely separates security from network addressing.
Instead, security is based on the identity of a pod, which is derived through
labels. This identity can be shared between pods. This means that when the
role=frontend pod is started, Cilium assigns an identity to that pod
which is then allowed to initiate connections to the identity of the
role=backend pod. The subsequent start of additional
only requires to resolve this identity via a key-value store, no action has to
be performed on any of the cluster nodes hosting
role=backend pods. The
starting of a new pod must only be delayed until the identity of the pod has
been resolved which is a much simpler operation than updating the security
rules on all other cluster nodes.
All security policies are described assuming stateful policy enforcement for
session based protocols. This means that the intent of the policy is to
describe allowed direction of connection establishment. If the policy allows
A => B then reply packets from
A are automatically allowed as
B is not automatically allowed to initiate connections to
A. If that outcome is desired, then both directions must be explicitly
Security policies may be enforced at ingress or egress. For ingress, this means that each cluster node verifies all incoming packets and determines whether the packet is allowed to be transmitted to the intended endpoint. Correspondingly, for egress each cluster node verifies outgoing packets and determines whether the packet is allowed to be transmitted to its intended destination.
In order to enforce identity based security in a multi host cluster, the identity of the transmitting endpoint is embedded into every network packet that is transmitted in between cluster nodes. The receiving cluster node can then extract the identity and verify whether a particular identity is allowed to communicate with any of the local endpoints.
Default Security Policy¶
If no policy is loaded, the default behavior is to allow all communication unless policy enforcement has been explicitly enabled. As soon as the first policy rule is loaded, policy enforcement is enabled automatically and any communication must then be white listed or the relevant packets will be dropped.
Similarly, if an endpoint is not subject to an L4 policy, communication from and to all ports is permitted. Associating at least one L4 policy to an endpoint will block all connectivity to ports unless explicitly allowed.
Orchestration System Specifics¶
Cilium regards each deployed
Pod as an endpoint with regards to networking and
security policy enforcement. Labels associated with pods can be used to define
the identity of the endpoint.
When two pods communicate via a service construct, then the labels of the origin pod apply to determine the identity.